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In contrast to Robert Mundell’s Optimum Currency Area theory and his recommendation of 
forming a monetary union, the economic fundamentals of Euro area member countries have not 
harmonized. The opposite holds: the Euro core countries - most of all Germany, but also the 
Netherlands and Finland - increased productivity growth while limiting nominal wage growth. 
However, Mediterranean countries - particularly Greece, but also Spain, Portugal, and Italy - 
have dramatically lost international competitiveness. Although the overall balance of payments 
for the Euro area at large is almost balanced, internal disequilibria are skyrocketing and default 
risk premiums and tensions within the Euro area are rising, thus jeopardizing the stability of the 
monetary union. The findings confirm that a common currency without fiscal union is inherently 
unstable.  The  international  financial  and  economic  crisis  has  merely  triggered  events  which 
highlight this instability. The paper discusses three possible scenarios for the future of the Euro: 
a laissez faire approach, a bailout, and finally an exit strategy for the Mediterranean countries, or 
an organized  exit by  a  group  of core  countries  led  by  Germany,  forming  their  own  smaller 
monetary union.  
Keywords: Optimum currency areas, monetary union, risk spreads, central banking, exchange 
rates, fiscal policy. 
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I. Introduction 
In the aftershock of the worldwide financial crisis one observes an interesting monetary 
coincidence: while an increasing number of countries accelerates its efforts to join the Euro 
area, several established Euro member countries have questioned whether they should remain 
part of the European Monetary Union. 
The first group, represented by countries like Hungary or Poland, sees Euro membership 
as  effective  protection  against  abrupt  outflows  of  capital,  currency  depreciation,  and 
consequently rising levels of debt denominated in foreign currency. Accession to the Euro area 
would remove currency risk on existing currency mismatches in asset/liability positions, lower 
refinancing costs via a reduced risk premium, and allow for a higher sustainable rate of economic 
growth. 
The  second  group  includes  current  Euro  member  countries  such  as  Greece,  Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain. All these countries share a common history of inflation and devaluation 
before joining the Euro area. Upon entering the Euro area, refinancing costs for this group of 
countries with low quality currencies decreased significantly.
2
 However, against expectations of 
the theory of optimum currency areas, macroeconomic fundamentals within the Euro area have 
drifted more and more apart since the launch of the common currency. A core Euro area, headed 
by  Germany, pursues  an export-led  growth strategy,  while  the  Mediterranean  fringe  of  euro 
member countries continues a dramatic loss in international competitiveness. 
Accelerating trade integration within Western Europe after Word War II has provoked an 
intensive  debate  about  a  common  currency  for  over  five  decades.
3
  The  plan  for  a  common 
currency  was  formalized  with  the  Dan  Hague  summit  of  1969  and  further  specified  in  the 
Werner  Report  of  1970.  Mundell‘s  (1961)  paper  on  Optimum  Currency  Areas  provided  the 
theoretical backbone and justification for a European Monetary Union.
4 
Contrary to the analysis of his mentor Meade and the emerging Chicago School, Mundell 
questions flexible exchange rates as the ideal international monetary arrangement to adjust to 
external shocks.
5
 In his paper, Mundell distinguishes an optimum currency area (region) from a 
country: supply or demand shocks might affect specific industries located in a region that need 
                                                 
2 For Italia, as an example, by entering the euro area the cost of serving the national debt decreased by 
approximately 4 percent of GDP annually. 
3 See for example Meade, J.E. (1957), Scitovsky, T. (1958), and Mundell, R. (1997). 
4 See Mundell, R. (1961). 
5 See also Mundell, R. (1997).   3
not coincide with a sovereign country. Under such conditions, the exchange rate fails as an 
adjustment mechanism. Mundell argues that the effectiveness of flexible exchange rates as an 
adjustment mechanism depends on money illusion; wage earners are not compensated perfectly 
for the reduction of nominal earnings through the increase of import prices. Mundell criticizes 
models based on money illusion, which assume that market participants understand a market 
economy poorly and do not learn. Particularly small and open economies would face a more 
significant pass-through effect from a depreciation of the currency to the domestic price level. 
He also questions the stability of international price systems after taking speculative demands 
into account.
6
 And finally, size matters: the effects of external shocks on economic output will be 
smaller for larger currency areas. 
Mundell  strictly  distinguishes  a  fixed  exchange  rate  system  from  a  pegging  system. 
While the former directly links the balance of payments to the money supply, the latter allows 
continued financing of disequilibria, with the risk of ultimately breaking the peg. In contrast, a 
fixed exchange rate system, such as a gold standard or any other kind of credible arrangement, 
would - according to the rules of the game - not allow any form of sterilization.
7
 Countries with 
balance  of  payments  surpluses  would  automatically  inflate,  while  countries  with  balance  of 
payment deficits, assuming sticky prices, would face higher unemployment and lower economic 
activity. Both forces at work would lead back to equilibrium. 
Under  flexible  exchange  rates  the  change  in  the  nominal  exchange  rate  should work 
towards equilibrium, substituting for factor mobility. Under a fixed regime internal adjustments 
are  necessary.  These  adjustment  processes  are  based  on  the  international  (or  intra-regional) 
mobility of capital and labor, and similar economic structures amongst the regions (countries). 
The European exchange rate system was stable from 1978, the inaugural year of the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism, until 1987. However, the parity grid of fixed exchange 
rates amongst its member states was not self-adjusting. Germany continued its export-oriented, 
mercantilist strategy, while the Mediterranean countries continued to rely on higher domestic 
absorption and easier monetary policy to drive their economies. The resulting shift in relative 
competitiveness had to be corrected through eleven realignments of the exchange rate grid. After 
several years without exchange rate realignments, the European exchange rate crisis of 1992 
                                                 
6 Mundell, R. (1961), p. 663. 
7 In reality, however, members of the gold standard did indeed violate the rules of the game in various ways. See for 
example Fratianni, Michele, and Andreas Hauskrecht (1998).   4
reflected the continued economic and monetary disparity within Europe. 
The decision to form a European Monetary Union certainly followed not only economic, 
but also political considerations. A stable European currency could challenge the US-dollar as 
the dominant international currency. Europe did not completely satisfy the preconditions of an 
optimum currency area set out by Mundell; however, this was similarly true for the United States 
of America and the unified Italy when forming their respective monetary unions.
8
 New empirical 
evidence that monetary unions endogenously increase intra-regional trade was supportive.
9
 In 
other words, although Europe initially did not satisfy Mundell‘s preconditions for an optimal 
currency area, it might grow into one. 
A decade after the euro was launched, results are mixed. The euro did grow into the role 
of  an  international  currency,  based  on  its  internal  and  external  stable  value.  However, 
fundamental disequilibria within the euro area have become more and more obvious. While a 
group of core countries such as Germany and the Netherlands further improved its competitive 
position, other countries, particularly the Mediterranean ones, fell drastically behind. The current 
world financial and economic crisis has aggravated the tensions within the European Monetary 
Union. Markets increasingly question if the monetary union is sustainable in its present form or 
if one or several countries will opt to leave the monetary union. 
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section we will analyze 
the rising heterogeneity in economic fundamentals within the European Monetary Union and 
discuss it in the context of Mundell‘s model. In the third section we will discuss three scenarios 
for the Mediterranean countries: I. Laissez faire: The market reacts to increasing disparity within 
the monetary union without monetary or financial bailout. II. Bailout: We differentiate between a 
pure financial (fiscal) and a monetary bailout. The latter obviously involves the European Central 
Bank  as  important  player.  III.  Exit  Strategies:  The  third  scenario  discusses  incentives  and 




                                                 
8 See also Fratianni, M. and A. Hauskrecht (2002). 
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II. Rising economic disparity within the European Monetary Union 
An optimum currency area under one monetary policy should produce similar rates of 
inflation for the entire area. Only minor regional deviation from the mean should occur, and only 
in  the  short  term.  Table  1  shows  the  compounded  price  level  changes  for  all  euro  member 
countries since the introduction. It reveals a surprisingly diverse picture of inflation for the euro 
area since the year 2000. At the low end, Germany and Finland experienced around 17 percent of 
accumulated and compounded inflation (CPI) over 9 years; Greece had the highest inflation with 
almost 36 percent, followed by Spain and Portugal, while Italy with 24.9 percent stays below the 
mean of 28.5 percent. 
Figure 1 reflects the change in economic competitiveness for the four Mediterranean euro 
member countries relative to Germany, measured in unit labor cost changes since 1991. Very 
similar to the inflation pattern, previously established convergence among member regions is lost 
after 2001/2. Table 2 plots unit labor costs from 2000 to 2008. While countries like Finland and 
Germany reduced unit labor costs, other countries, foremost Italy, increased unit labor costs by 
more than 40 percent. Consequently, the former group has improved its relative competitiveness 
of export industries, while the latter is falling behind. 
Rising unit labor costs are the result of nominal wage increases above productivity gains 
in a given period. Table 3 shows the annual change in nominal wages of the Mediterranean 
countries. In the latter, particularly in Greece, nominal wage increases skyrocketed through 2009 
with a staggering increase of almost 15 percent, followed by Italy and Spain with respectively 
5.6 and 5.4 percent. 
Figure  2  shows  that  productivity  growth  of  the  Mediterranean  countries  has 
systematically lagged behind the trend in Germany, with Greece showing the most drastic swings 
in annual productivity changes. The figure illustrates that the rising disparity in unit labor costs is 
fueled by two sources, lower productivity  growth and higher nominal  wage increases in the 
Mediterranean countries. In other words, the Mediterranean countries distributed welfare gains 
that never existed to its workers. 
The  discussion  above  demonstrates  that  euro  member  regions  have  drifted  apart 
significantly in their macroeconomic fundamentals. Without the exchange rate as an adjustment 
instrument, the only variable left is an adjustment of future wage levels. Given the stronger 
German productivity growth and modest wage increases, the Mediterranean countries face a very   6
difficult task in regaining competitiveness both within the euro area and the rest of the world. 
Table  4  starkly  demonstrates  the  rising  heterogeneity  in  international  competitiveness 
within the euro area. Austria, Finland and Germany show a robust growth in exports relative to 
average export growth for the euro area, based on a decrease in real wage levels. The opposite is 
true  for  the  Mediterranean  countries:  real  wage  increases  coincide  with  weak  export 
performance.  The  diverging  export  performance  results  in  dramatic  disparities  in  euro  area 
member current accounts; the Mediterranean countries show significant and increasing current 
account  deficits,  lead  by  Greece  with  a  deficit  of  close  to  15  percent  in  2008, followed  by 
Portugal and Spain. Interestingly, although with similar losses in international competitiveness, 
Italy was able to keep its current account deficit around a modest 1 percent of GDP. 
In  sum,  we  see  a  dramatic  deviation  in  the  economic  fundamentals  of  euro  member 
countries  that  causes  rising  trade  and  current  account  imbalances,  which  contradicts  the 
predictions of the optimum currency area literature. 
Figure 3 plots the export performance from 1999-2006 on the horizontal axis and the 
change in the real exchange rate on the vertical axis, in both cases relative to the mean of all euro 
member countries. The first quadrant, in the graph represented by Ireland and the Netherlands, 
stands for rising exports, causing an upward trend in the price level. The fourth quadrant plots 
countries with rising exports coupled with a real depreciation towards the rest of the euro area, 
represented by Finland, Austria, and Germany. The second quadrant shows countries with a real 
appreciation of the exchange rate and a relative reduction in export performance, notably France, 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain. The second quadrant manifests the rising heterogeneity within the 
monetary union: all countries in this quadrant experienced a real appreciation of the exchange 
rate (a decline in competitiveness) and export performance below the mean of the monetary 
union. 
Until  recently,  strong  capital  inflows  to  the  Mediterranean  countries  financed  their 
imbalances relatively easy. Figure 4 shows very significant Foreign Direct Investments for Spain 
and Italy, while Greece depended more on international debt financing. 
Agitated by the international financial crisis, capital markets increasingly have begun to 
price in rising default risk for the Mediterranean countries. Even before the Greek crisis, risk 
spreads for 10-year sovereign bonds increased significantly (see figures 5 and 6 in the appendix). 
   7
Macroeconomic fundamentals and rising disequilibria caused a market reaction, leading 
to higher refinancing costs for  Mediterranean  countries. This group of  countries is therefore 
losing  its  biggest  benefit  of  entering  the  euro  area:  financing  costs  close  to  the  German 
benchmark.
10 Of course, increased financing costs affect each country to a different degree. In 
2007 (before the financial crisis hit the markets), the savings-investment gap, and with it the 
current  account  deficit,  for  Italy  was  a  modest  1  percent;  it  reached  close  to  9  percent  for 
Portugal and Spain, and a remarkable 13.9 percent for Greece. Higher financing costs hit the 
latter countries hardest. 
Ten years after its creation, the diagnosis for the euro is straightforward: diverging trends 
in productivity growth and nominal wage increases produce significant differences in unit labor 
costs  amongst  euro  member  countries.  This  heterogeneous  development  of  economic 
competitiveness is reflected in current account balances. Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, and 
Austria  realize  significant  surpluses  in  trade within  the  euro  area and  the  rest  of the  world. 
Meanwhile,  several  other  euro  member  countries,  particularly  the  Mediterranean  countries, 
produce trade deficits; Greece, Spain, and Portugal have produced dramatically high deficits. 
Diverging  real  exchange  rates,  rising  current  account  imbalances  and  international 
creditor/debtor  positions  are  incompatible  with  a  monetary  union  without  a  fiscal  union,  in 
particular a system of fiscal transfers to finance weaker regions. In the following section we 
discuss three paths of adjustment for the euro area. We start with a laissez-faire assumption that 
would leave the burden of adjustment entirely to the deficit countries. This is followed by a 
bailout  scenario,  where  the  burden  of  adjustment  is  shared  amongst  the  surplus  and  deficit 
countries of the euro area. The benefits of a monetary union without a fiscal union accrued in the 
form of low interest rates for weaker member countries. With risk premia re-emerging this does 
not hold anymore, the  gains  from being in the monetary union diminish, and exit strategies 





                                                 
10 We will discuss the composition of risk premia in default and currency spreads in section 3 of the paper.   8
III. Three scenarios for adjustment 
a) Laissez-faire 
A  laissez-faire  scenario  is  based  on  a  credible  non-bailout  clause  for  euro  member 
countries,  as  outlined  in  the  Maastricht  treaty.  In  this  case,  the  Mediterranean  countries 
unilaterally bear the costs of economic adjustment. 
Since  the  introduction  of  the  European  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism  (ERM),  the 
Mediterranean countries have  frequently  devalued their domestic currencies against the DM, 
previously  the  regional  key  currency.  Losses  in  competitiveness  were  compensated  for  by 
nominal exchange rate adjustments, implicitly confirming Keynes‘ notion that the exchange rate 
is a more effective instrument than direct changes in wage levels.
11  
Significant deviations in productivity growth in a monetary union are not uncommon and 
can also be observed for the United States (see figure 7). However, the main difference between 
the U.S. and the euro area is the degree of labor mobility, which is significantly higher in the 
U.S. The labor market in the euro area is still fragmented in national segments. The violation of 
one of the key pillars (labor mobility) of the optimum currency area theory haunts the euro area 
today (see tables 5 and 6).
12
 
We offer two explanations for the low mobility of labor within the European monetary 
union.  The  first  obstacle for  labor  mobility  is  obviously language  barriers,  complicating job 
search and employment in other euro member countries. The second explanation refers to 
the still fragmented social security systems amongst member countries of the monetary union. As 
long as it remains difficult (if not impossible) to switch between social security systems amongst 
member countries, and the social security schemes of the Mediterranean countries are generously 
designed, the labor force in these countries has little incentive to migrate into surplus countries. 
However, rising debt burdens will force this group of countries to reduce its debt burden and 
ongoing budget deficits, ultimately cutting back its social security benefits, and lowering the 
migration threshold. Consequently, a laissez-faire scenario may ultimately lead to massive labor 
migration from south to north within the monetary union, reducing the labor force in the south 
and  putting  pressure  on  labor  markets  in  the  north,  most  likely  in  lowskill  labor  market 
                                                 
11 It is worth noting that exactly this money illusion is one of the main reasons why Mundell questions the exchange 
rate as an adjustment instrument (Mundell 1961). 
12 Mundell knew about the relatively low labor mobility for Europe. It remains unclear why he thought a higher 
level of capital mobility could compensate for the absence of the former (see Mundell 1997).   9
segments.
13 
Given the wide gap in macroeconomic fundamentals that occurred since the euro was 
launched, the Mediterranean countries will face a long and painful adjustment process. The 
best way to think about balance of payment problems in a monetary union is to apply the gold 
standard framework. A reduction in available capital will increase its cost, causing deflationary 
and recessionary pressure on the economies. This will result in decreasing real wage levels and 
rising unemployment. Capital markets, demanding higher risk premiums, will punish failures in 
necessary economic adjustments. 
During the Greek Crisis in spring 2010, France led several euro member countries in 
criticizing  Germany  for  its  mercantilist  export-led  growth  model.  By  keeping  nominal  wage 
increases below productivity gains, Germany forces other euro member countries into a spiral of 
wage deflation. Tables 7 and 8 show trade balances of euro member countries with respect to the 
world and other euro member countries. In 2008, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, and the 
Netherlands  all  showed  surpluses  in  intra-euro  trade;  Germany  has  by  far  the  highest  trade 
surplus of $263 billion, while Ireland has the biggest relative trade surplus with 22 percent of 
GDP. Belgium has a significant intra-euro trade surplus of $23.5 billion, while its trade balance 
with  the  rest  of  the  world  shows  a  deficit  of  approximately  $17  billion.  Austria  shows  the 
opposite pattern: the intra-euro balance is negative at $25 billion, while the trade balance with 
the rest of the world shows a surplus of $22.3 billion. 
France has the largest intra-euro deficit of roughly $110 billion; this deficit has increased 
every year since 1999, while its trade with the rest of the world is almost perfectly balanced. 
Amongst the  Mediterranean  countries,  Italy  has recorded  a  marginal intra-euro deficit and  a 
modest  overall  deficit  of  around  1  percent  of  GDP  since  1999.  The  remaining  three 
Mediterranean members show a very similar pattern: very significant intra-euro deficits (Greece 
8%, Portugal 9%, Spain 3%), and even higher overall trade deficits (Greece 18%, Portugal 14%, 
Spain 9%). 
Germany‘s intra-euro surplus remained relatively stable at 2 percent of GDP, while the 
overall trade surplus increased significantly to 7 percent. In 1999, 45 percent of all exports went 
to other euro member states; this number decreased to 42 percent in 2008. 
 
                                                 
13 We will return to this argument when discussing the exit option.   10
Tables 9 and 10 sketch the export performance of all euro member countries between 1999 and 
2008, again within the euro area and with the world. Germany‘s share of all euro area exports 
grew from around 25 to slightly below 27 percent, while Germany‘s share of intraeuro exports as 
a percentage of its overall exports declines from above 44 to slightly below 43 percent. 
The data analysis gives little reason to blame Germany for increased trade disequilibria in 
the euro area. Most of Germany‘s trade surpluses occur outside the euro area. The Mediterranean 
countries, with the exception of Italy, show high trade deficits with euro member countries and 
the  outside  world,  reflecting  a  loss  of  international  competitiveness  and  high  domestic 
absorption. 
Obviously, a solution for the sovereign debt burden for these countries alone will not 
address the fundamental issue of a dramatic loss in international competitiveness. 
 
b) Bailout 
Fiscal accounting inconsistencies and the revelation of dramatically higher current budget 
deficits have caused the Greek risk premium for capital to increase markedly. Greece‘s increased 
cost of capital has provoked a debate about the pros and cons of an intra-euro area bailout. 
Proponents  of  a  bailout  strategy  fear  uncontrolled  spillover  effects  to  other  euro  member 
countries, amplifying the crisis scenario. However, the direct financial bailout of a euro member 
country by other members violates the spirit of the Stability and Growth Pact as well as the 
Treaty of Maastricht.
14
 The logic and justification for the bailout plan for Greece is to avoid a 
contagion effect, which would infect other euro member countries and jeopardize their ability to 
refinance their sovereign debt. Borrowing from banking crisis terminology, Greece is perceived 
as too big to fail. 
This logic is flawed in at least two dimensions. First, the contagion effect applies to a 
scenario where fundamentally healthy countries are infected by the crisis in another country. The 
term economic contagion should not be used for the case when the market treats countries with 
similar economic fundamental disequilibria equally. Secondly, any bailout plan based on the 
argument of too big to fail must be credible. However, while the economies and sovereign debts 
of Greece and Portugal are relatively small, the bailout for countries like Spain or even Italy is 
beyond the budget constraint for all euro member countries. If a bailout of these countries is not 
                                                 
14 See Treaty, 124 and 125.   11
in reach, a restructuring of their debt burden remains an option. 
The justification for approaching the IMF as a partner in the bailout remains unclear. By 
principle,  the  IMF  was  designed  under  the  Bretton  Woods  regime  to  assist  countries  by 
providing international liquidity (usually denominated in US$) in cases of balance of payments 
turbulences, thereby providing some additional leeway for the country to realize the necessary 
domestic adjustments by means of fiscal and  monetary policy. After the breakup of Bretton 
Woods, the IMF maintained this emergency lending function despite the absence of any binding 
international monetary arrangement. However, in the case of Greece, IMF lending instead has 
the sole purpose of financing the budget of a member state of the euro area, thus obviously not 
financing  a  balance  of  payments  problem.  In  pursuing  this  path,  the  IMF  effectively  opens 
Pandora‘s  Box  for  applications  of  a  different  type  of  lending,  softening  national  budget 
constraints and fiscal discipline. 
The bailout package for Greece comes with very strict conditions that will force Greece 
to  follow  a  long-term  austerity  policy.  The  dramatic  forced  reduction  in  government 
expenditures  is  a  very  effective built-in destabilizer,  most  likely  causing  recession, reducing 
future government revenues, and further aggravating the Greek budget crisis. Therefore, it does 
not seem venturesome to predict that at the end of this process Greece will nevertheless choose 
debt restructuring as the appropriate solution. In other words, the bailout package is ineffective 
and only postpones a necessary debt restructuring. 
The  main  argument  against  a  bailout  solution  is  that  it  will  increase  moral  hazard 
behavior  amongst  euro  member  states  and  weaken  their  willingness  to  introduce  painful 
necessary domestic adjustments. Fears, especially in Germany, of excessive deficit spending by 
some euro member states motivated the Stability and Growth Pact. These fears assumed that 
excessive  deficit  spending  would  require  a  bailout  by  either  the  European  Central  Bank, 
jeopardizing price stability, or by the tax payers of richer member states. The Pact and the non-
bailout clause in the treaty sought to prevent fiscal profligacy by individual member states and 
the need to socialize the related bailout cost amongst euro area. 
The  economic  literature  is divided  about  the  pros  and  cons  of  fiscal  constraints,  and 
numerical  targets  in  particular.
15
  Restricted  fiscal  policy  reduces  the  strength  of  built-in 
                                                 
15 See for discussion von Hagen, Juergen (1992), Eichengreen, Barry, and Juergen von Hagen (1995), Poterba, 
James M. (1996), and Corsetti, Giancarlo, and Nouriel Roubini (1996).   12
stabilizers and limits tax-smoothening and economic stimuli in times of recession. 
Reference to the U.S. as a justification for the pact is misguided. Although 49 of 50 U.S. 
states  have  fiscal  constraints  in  place  (the  exception  is  the  state  of  Vermont),  none  of  the 
restrictions originally intended to reduce inflationary risk for the dollar area. Rather, skepticism 
among citizens of the wisdom of politicians spending tax dollars motivated fiscal constraints. 
Further, various ways exist to circumvent these constraints, at least in the short-run, and to build 
up significant state debt levels. Sachs and Xavier Sala-I Martin (1992) show that the federal tax 




Eichengreen and von Hagen (1992) argue that a central government‘s incentive to restrict 
a given state‘s debt depends on its share of the tax base. The smaller the tax base of a state 
relative to its spending, the more difficult fiscal adjustments to shocks are; consequently, states 
might seek rescue in debt financing. In summary, the striking difference between the U.S. and 
the euro area is that the former monetary union never considered the option of a bailout on the 
state level. From this perspective, the Growth and Stability Pact seems ill designed; given their 
large domestic tax base, euro member states have sufficient opportunities to increase revenues or 
decrease spending to master fiscal problems. By unnecessarily adding the Pact to enforce the 
non-bailout  clause,  and  then  breaking  the  non-bailout  promise  at  the  first  challenge  for  the 
system, the European monetary union has exposed itself to the worst of all options: a systemic 
bailout as part of the monetary arrangement.
17 
A bailout pact for the euro will spread the financing burden to all member states and 
hence increase financing costs. Contrary to the laissez-faire scenario, the rising risk premium for 
capital will be shared amongst all member states. This is of particular interest, because without 
further political unification, fiscal policy will remain largely on the national level, while the 
entire monetary union shares the financing costs. The electoral constituency of surplus countries 
will likely and increasingly oppose this path, especially when bailouts of individual member 
states do not prevent them from ultimately seeking debt restructuring and spreading such fears to 
other euro member states. 
                                                 
16 As of end of 2009, all states have a debt level below 10 percent of state GDP. 
17 The Greek GDP in 2009 was approximately 2.6 percent of the economic output of all euro member countries. The 
combined share of Mediterranean countries of overall euro GDP is 33 percent. Italy has a share of roughly 1 percent, 
Spain 11.7 percent.   13
In  this  context,  the  bailout  plan  for  Greece  seems  to  be  not  only  futile,  but  also 
economically detrimental. By sharing the Greek debt burden, all euro member countries now 
identify the need for reducing national fiscal deficits and government spending. Consequently, 
the  economic  growth  within  the  euro  countries  will  be  negatively  affected  and  economic 
recovery  is  hindered.  The  euro-wide  crowding  out  effect  for  private  investment  will  further 
impede economic growth. 
By guaranteeing sovereign bonds of other euro member states, the surplus countries make 
purchases of such bonds a profitable and risk-free investment for banks, which might use these 
securities in refinancing operations with the European Central Bank. By extending its deadline 
for accepting lower-rated securities as collateral for open market operations, the ECB facilitates 
this  channel.  As  a  result, the  wall  between  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  within  the euro area 
becomes  thinner.  By  buying  sovereign  debt  with  low  ratings,  the  ECB  contributes  to  the 
intermingling of the bailout for a member state and banks that invested in such securities. 
The bailout option can also be interpreted as a substitute for a missing common fiscal 
policy, i.e., a system of financial transfers amongst member states. As discussed in the previous 
section, a laissez-faire scenario would most likely lead to a rising labor migration from southern 
to northern member countries, putting pressure on the labor markets of the latter. Periodical 
bailouts or a system of fiscal transfers might be the alternatives to the labor migration scenario: 
the richer and more productive northern countries would finance the southern member countries 
in order to avoid migration. 
 
c) Exit-option 
Given the umbrella-like protection the euro has provided its member countries during the 
recent financial crisis, there are no incentives for a highly indebted member country to opt out of 
the  monetary  union.  However,  the  data  on  macroeconomic  fundamentals  for  euro  member 
countries provided in section II of this paper provide evidence that several countries failed to 
introduce  the  fiscal  and  wage  discipline  needed  to  avoid  significant  macroeconomic 
disequilibria.  The  main  advantage  of  the  euro  for  a  prospective  member  country  -  besides 
reputational  benefits  -  is  a  significant  decrease  in  the  financing  premium  for  sovereign  and 
corporate  bonds.  Given  a  government  debt  of  around  100  percent  of  GDP  or  more,  a  euro 
membership is worth 3-4 percent of GDP annually. In return, a nation abandons the nominal   14
exchange rate as an easy-to-use instrument to compensate for domestic overspending. Entry into 
the  European  monetary  union  made  financing  of  such  overspending  and  the  loss  of 
competitiveness a simple task, accomplished through private capital inflows and the issuance of 
additional sovereign debt at low cost. But disparities within the euro area have reached levels 
that make markets question the sustainability of a historically unknown enterprise - the creation 
of a monetary union without a political union - and caused risk spreads to rise again. 
The most important disadvantage of exiting the euro would be the reoccurrence of a 
currency premium on top of the default premium. In addition, the re-establishment of a national 
currency would cause a significant currency mismatch in national debt, converting existing euro 
debt  into  a  foreign  currency  liability  exposed  to  exchange  rate  risk.  So  from  a  financial 
viewpoint,  the  exit  strategy  would  increase  the  cost  of  financing  the  national  debt.  An  exit 
strategy consequently would demand as a first step a debt restructuring. 
Clearly, no incentives exist for countries to exit the euro area as long as a bailout scenario 
is possible. The exit strategy is the alternative to a world of laissez-fair. Given the burden of a 
bailout for the surplus countries, it seems likely that opposition to such plans will form soon. 
This would leave the Mediterranean countries alone to master the burden of adjustment. The 
obvious advantage of an exit would be re-gaining the exchange rate as an adjustment instrument 
to reduce high unit labor costs and a loss in international competitiveness. With a history of 
currency devaluation, it does not seem improbable that a populist politician in a Mediterranean 
country will label the euro as the scapegoat responsible for domestic troubles and offer to lead 
the country back to independence of ECB patronage. From an economist‘s viewpoint, it reduces 
to the question: to what extent will nominal exchange rate changes have real effects? 
The analysis above has shown that either the laissez-faire or the bailout strategy will 
come with significant costs for the northern euro member countries. The laissez-faire scenario 
eventually will cause an increase in labor migration from south to north, leaving the need for 
adjustment of northern countries‘ labor markets. The bailout scenario entails either frequent ad 
hoc interventions or a system of fiscal transfers from the northern to the southern euro member 
countries in order to avoid such labor migration. In this case, taxpayers throughout the euro zone 
will pay the bill. This latter scenario resembles the cases of Mezzogiorno in Italy and Eastern 
Germany, both regions that received massive fiscal transfers from richer regions in the country in 
order to avoid, or at least limit, labor migration, politically packaged as an act of patriotism and   15
solidarity.
18 
It does not seem unlikely that voters in richer northern countries will not support such 
a intra-euro area transfer system. Given a lack of intra-euro patriotism, an organized exit of 
current surplus countries of the euro area, led by Germany, might become an option, leading to a 
new, smaller, and more coherent euro area with similar economic structures that might be able to 
achieve a monetary and fiscal union. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
Three main factors contribute to the current tensions in the euro area: first, the adverse 
impact of low labor mobility on adjustment processes has been underestimated and amplified by 
differences  in  economic  structures  amongst  member  states.  Secondly,  by  linking  national 
bankruptcy  with  euro  membership,  enormous  costs  of  bailouts  are  spread  among  all  euro 
member  countries  who  now  share  the  burden  of  higher  refinancing  costs  of  national  debt. 
Thirdly, by linking the bailout of a member state with the (national) bailout of banks invested in 
such securities, the potential bill has become enormous and undermines the will and capability of 
a bailout-guarantee for larger economies of the euro area. 
The case of Greece is an interesting precursor of difficulties the euro area will face in the 
future. Fundamental macroeconomic data such as an unsustainable high current account deficit 
and rapidly rising nominal wages indicated already in 2009 that at some point Greece would 
come under market pressure, first visible in rising default risk spreads for its government debt 
relative to the German benchmark. The revision of past statistics and the current budget deficit 
aggravated the market pressure and finally triggered a full-blown economic crisis. 
The crisis started as a liquidity emergency, with the Greek government asking for credit 
guarantees from other euro member countries to calm financial markets and secure a reduction in 
the risk spread to re-finance the government debt. Early credit guarantees promised a subsidized 
refinancing rate of 5 percent for Greek government debt. This development is surprising for at 
least two reasons. First, the euro members needlessly constructed a link between membership in 
the euro and fiscal distress. For example, in the U.S. sub-national districts are allowed to go 
bankrupt (Orange county to name a recent example) without debating the role of the dollar as 
                                                 
18 It is worth mentioning that in both cases massive fiscal transfers were not able to avoid massive migration of 
particularly younger people to the rich north of Italy and West Germany.   16
legal tender. Greece never faced a balance of payments problem, but rather the threat of a debt 
default. 
Second, the original bailout scenario ignored that Greece was already heading towards 
bankruptcy.  Even  under  the  most  optimistic  assumptions  regarding  the  ability  to  reduce  the 
primary deficit and GDP growth, Greece will not be able to avoid state bankruptcy. Providing 
subsidized interest rates for Greece government debt will not solve the problem, but merely 
postpones bankruptcy. Economies do not follow the economic logic of a firm; by dramatically 
reducing government spending, Greece will fall into a vicious circle of declining real GDP and 
even higher debt burdens. A negative spiral of reduced euro-wide government spending and 
rising refinancing costs for private investment will most likely aggravate the crisis, and not end 
it. 
Instead  of  allowing  a  market  solution  (laissez-faire)  by  having  the  burden  be  shared 
among  market  participants  or  trading  Greek  debt  with  a  significant  haircut,  euro  member 
countries  decided  to  bailout  both  the  Greek  government  and  the  euro  area  banks  who  are 
invested in Greek securities. 
While  the  authors  of  this  paper  object  to  both  bailouts,  we  find  the  link  between 
bailingout  domestic  financial  institutions  and  the  Greek  government  especially  misguided;  a 
bailout  of  banks  could  have  been  organized  domestically  without  breaching  the  non-bailout 
promise of the Treaty. Furthermore, the bailout itself does not restore competitiveness to the 
Greek economy. Greece will face one or even two decades of fiscal austerity policies, and after 
all of this, the exit from the euro area might only be delayed. Markets immediately started to test 
the  new  rules  by  attacking  Portuguese  and  Spanish  government  debt:  the  same  game,  but  a 
bigger  wheel.  Pandora‘s  Box  has  been  opened.  The  recourse  to  the  too  big  to  fail  case  for 
financial institutions is misguided, because market participants know that no bailout package 
would be available when Spanish or Italian sovereign debt came under similar distress. 
Discussions about the pros and cons of an exit strategy depend largely on the perspective. 
For the core euro member countries, the exit of some or all Mediterranean countries certainly 
would  reduce  potential  fiscal  burdens  and  also  reduce  pressure  on  the  euro.  Mediterranean 
countries  face  a  trickier  set  of  tradeoffs.  Past  experiences  of  other  countries  being  able  to 
reestablish international competitiveness through a real depreciation of domestic currency speak 
in favor of an exit strategy. This requires, of course, a non-complete pass-through of the change   17
in the nominal exchange rate to the domestic price level. Opponents of an exit strategy also point 
to an additional currency risk premium that might make the way out of the economic mess even 
more difficult. 
A survival of the euro area in its current form will either lead to a rising labor migration 
from the southern to northern countries to cause an adjustment process through labor markets or 
a system of fiscal transfers from the northern to the southern countries to avoid or at least reduce 
labor migration within the euro area. Both strategies will come with high costs for the surplus 
countries. 
Ultimately, the monetary history gives ample evidence of failures in forming monetary 
without a parallel political unification, in particular unification of fiscal policies. The European 




                                                 
19 See for examples and evidence Theurl, Theresia (1992), who discusses several attempts forming a monetary 
unification in Europe in the nineteenth century. Particularly the Latin Monetary union of 1865/6 shows surprising 
similarities with the current crises of the EMU. Two countries, Italy and Greece, flooded the Union with sovereign 
securities of low quality.   18
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Figure 3: Real Exchange Rate and Relative Export Performance
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Figure 4: FDI Net Inflows 
Sources: World Bank World Development
Figure 5: 10-year Bond Spread Relative to Germany
Source: OECD 
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Figure 7: U.S. State Labor Productivity
Note: Each line represents a d
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Table 6: Country Annual Migration, as percentage of total population
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Table 8: Trade Balance with World, Billions of USD
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics
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Table 10: Exports (f.o.b.) to World, Billions of USD
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics
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